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Abstract. Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A
prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market where n advertisers com-
pete for the assignment of one of k sponsored search results, also known as “slots”, for
certain keywords they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market
equilibria correspond to stable matchings. In this paper, we show how to modify Kuhn’s
Hungarian Method (Kuhn, 1955) so that it finds an optimal stable matching between ad-
vertisers and advertising slots in settings with generalized linear utilities, per-bidder-item
reserve prices, and per-bidder-item maximum prices. The only algorithm for this problem
presented so far (Aggarwal et al., 2009) requires the market to be in “general position”.
We do not make this assumption.
1. Introduction
Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime ex-
ample of such a market is the sponsored search market [14] where n advertisers (or bidders)
compete for the assignment of one of k sponsored search results, also known as “slots”, for
certain keywords (or items) they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind,
market equilibria correspond to stable matchings. A stable matching that is preferred by
all bidders over all other stable matchings is bidder optimal. Mechanisms that compute
bidder optimal matchings typically provide the bidders with the incentive to reveal their
true preferences, i.e., they are truthful.
In the most basic model of a two-sided matching market, known as the stable marriage
problem [9], each bidder has a strict preference ordering over the items and each item has
a strict preference ordering over the bidders. In a more general model, see e.g. [16], each
bidder has a linear utility function for each item that depends on the price of the item and
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every item can have a reserve price, i.e., a price under which the item cannot be sold to any
bidder. In the even stronger model that we study here every bidder-item pair can have a
reserve price, i.e., a price under which the item cannot be sold to this specific bidder, and a
maximum price, i.e., a price above which this bidder does not want to buy this specific item.
We call this model the sponsored search market. An interesting property of this model is
that it generalizes standard auction formats such as VCG [17, 4, 10] and GSP [7].
While the problem of finding a bidder optimal matching in the first two models has
been largely solved in the 60s, 70s, and 80s [9, 16, 5, 15], the problem of finding a bidder
optimal matching in the sponsored search market has been addressed only recently [2].
The main finding of [2] is that if the market is in “general position”, then (a) there is
a unique bidder optimal matching and (b) it can be found in O(nk3) steps by a truthful
mechanism. For a market to be in “general position”, however, any two reserve prices
and/or maximum prices must be distinct. In practice, this will rarely be the case and
so we typically have to deal with markets that are not in general position. The authors
of [2] propose to bring such markets into “general position” using random perturbations
and/or symbolic tie-breaking. The problem with this approach, however, is that there is no
guarantee that a bidder optimal solution of the perturbed market leads to a bidder optimal
solution of the original market. In fact, such a solution may not even exist (see Section 3).
Additionally, a pertubation-based mechanism may not be truthful.
We improve upon the results of [2] as follows: First, in Section 3, we show how to
modify the definition of stability so that a bidder optimal matching is guaranteed to exist for
arbitrary markets. Then, in Section 5, 6, and 7, we show how to modify Kuhn’s Hungarian
Method [13, 8] so that it finds a bidder optimal matching in time O(nk3 log(k)). Afterwards,
in Section 8, we show that with our notion of stability bidder optimality no longer implies
truthfulness, unless further restrictions are imposed on the model. Finally, in Section 9, we
show how to reduce more general linear utility functions to our setting.1
Independently of us Ashlagi et al. [3] also improved upon the results of [2] by (a)
showing the existence of a unique feasible, envy free, and Pareto efficient solution for position
auctions with budgets and by (b) providing a truthful mechanism that finds it. The notion
of envy-freeness is equivalent to our notion of stability. Their model, however, is a special
case of our model as it requires a common preference ordering over the items, it does not
incorporate reserve prices, it does not allow the maximum prices to depend on the bidder
and the item, and it requires the maximum prices to be distinct.
Recently, Kempe et al. [12] presented an efficient algorithm that finds the minimum
envy-free prices (if they exist) for a given matching.
To summarize our main contributions are: (1) We show how to modify the Hungarian
Method so that it finds a bidder optimal solution for arbitrary markets, including markets
that are not in “general position”. (2) We show how different definitions of stability affect
the existence of a bidder optimal solution. (3) We show how to reduce more general linear
utility functions to the setting that we study in this paper with no loss in performance.
2. Problem Statement
We are given a set I of n bidders and a set J of k items. We use letter i to denote a
bidder and letter j to denote an item. For each bidder i and item j we are given a valuation
1These utilities can be used to model that the click probability in the pay-per-click model has a bidder-
dependent component ci and an item-dependent component cj . See [1, 7] for details.
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vi,j, a reserve price ri,j , and a maximum price mi,j. We assume that the set of items J
contains a dummy item j0 for which all bidders have a valuation of zero, a reserve price of
zero, and a maximum price of ∞.2
We want to compute a matching µ ⊆ I × J and per-item prices p = (p1, . . . , pk). We
require that every bidder i appears in exactly one bidder-item pair (i, j) ∈ µ and that every
non-dummy item j 6= j0 appears in at most one such pair. We allow the dummy item j0 to
appear more than once. We call bidders (items) that are not matched to any non-dummy
item (bidder) unmatched. We regard the dummy item as unmatched.
We define the utility ui of bidder i to be ui = 0 if bidder i is unmatched and ui = ui,j(pj)
if bidder i is matched to item j at price pj . We set ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj if pj < mi,j and
ui,j(pj) = −∞ if pj ≥ mi,j. We say that a matching µ with prices p is feasible if (1) ui ≥ 0
for all i, (2) pj0 = 0 and pj ≥ 0 for all j 6= j0, and (3) ri,j ≤ pj < mi,j for all (i, j) ∈ µ. We
say that a feasible matching µ with prices p is stable if ui ≥ ui,j(pj) for all (i, j) ∈ I × J.
3
Finally, we say that a stable matching µ with prices p is bidder optimal if ui ≥ u
′
i for all i
and stable matchings µ′ with prices p′.
We say that an algorithm is truthful if for every bidder i with utility functions ui,1(·), . . . ,
ui,k(·) and any two inputs (u
′
i,j(·), ri,j ,m
′
i,j) and (u
′′
i,j(·), ri,j ,m
′′
i,j) with u
′
i,j(·) = ui,j(·) for i
and all j and u′k,j(·) = u
′′
k,j(·) for k 6= i and all j and matchings µ
′ with p′ and µ′′ with p′′ we
have that ui,j′(p
′
j′) ≥ ui,j′′(p
′′
j′′) where (i, j) ∈ µ and (i, j
′′) ∈ µ′′. This definition formalizes
the notion that “lying does not pay off” as follows: Even if bidder i claims that his utility
is u′′i,j instead of ui,j he will not achieve a higher utility with the prices and the matching
computed by the algorithm. Thus, the algorithm “encourages truthfulness”.
3. Motivation
The definition of stability in [2], which we call relaxed stability to indicate that every
stable solution is also relaxed stable (but not vice versa), requires that for every pair (i, j) ∈
I×J either (a) ui ≥ vi,j−max(pj, ri,j) or (b) pj ≥ mi,j. The disadvantage of relaxed stability
is that there can be situations where no bidder optimal solution exists if the market is not
in “general position” (see [2] for a formal definition). Here are two canonical examples:
• Example 1. There are three bidders and two items. The valuations and reserve prices
are as follows: v1,1 = 1, v2,1 = 4, v2,2 = 4, v3,2 = 1, r1,1 = 0, r2,1 = r2,2 = 2, and r3,2 = 0.
While µ = {(1, 1), (2, 2)} with p = (0, 2) is “best” for bidder 1, µ = {(2, 1), (3, 2)} with
p = (2, 0) is “best” for bidder 3.
• Example 2. There are two bidders and one item. The valuations and maximum prices
are as follows: v1,1 = 10, v2,1 = 10, and m1,1 = m2,1 = 5.While µ = {(1, 1)} with p1 = 5
is “best” for bidder 1, µ = {(2, 1)} with p1 = 5 is “best” for bidder 2.
In the market of the first example no bidder optimal solution exists as long as there
exists a bidder that has the same utility functions and reserve prices for two items and two
other bidders that are only interested in one of the items. In the market of the second
example no bidder optimal solution exists as long as both bidders have the same maximum
price and a non-zero utility at the maximum price. Since these cases are quite general, we
conjecture that they occur rather frequently in practice.
2Reserve utilities, or outside options oi, can be incorporated by setting vi,j0 = oi for all bidders i.
3Since we have ui ≥ 0 and ui,j(pj) = −∞ if pj ≥ mi,j , this definition is equivalent to requiring ui ≥
vi,j − pj for all items j with pj < mi,j .
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Figure 1: The left two graphs illustrate Example 1. The right two graphs illustrate Example
2. Bidders are on the left side, items on the right side of the bipartite graph. The
numbers next to the bidder indicate her utility, the numbers next to the item
indicate its price. The labels along the edge show valuations and reserve prices
for the left two graphs and valuations and maximum prices for the right two
graphs. With relaxed stability a bidder optimal matching does not exist.
With our notion of stability a bidder optimal solution is guaranteed to exist (e.g. µ =
{(2, 1)} with p1 = p2 = 2 in Example 1 and µ = ∅ with p1 = 5 in Example 2) for all kinds
of markets, including markets that are not in general position.
4. Preliminaries
We define the first choice graph Gp = (I ∪ J, Fp) at prices p as follows: There is one
node per bidder i, one node per item j, and an edge from i to j if and only if item j gives
bidder i the highest utility possible, i.e., ui,j(pj) ≥ ui,j′(pj′) for all j
′. For i ∈ I we define
Fp(i) = {j : ∃ (i, j) ∈ Fp} and similarly Fp(j) = {i : ∃ (i, j) ∈ Fp}. Analogously, for T ⊆ I
we define Fp(T ) = ∪i∈TFp(i) and for S ⊆ J we define Fp(S) = ∪j∈SFp(j). Note that (1)
pj < mi,j for all (i, j) ∈ Fp and (2) if the matching µ with prices p is stable then µ ⊆ Fp.
We define the feasible first choice graph G˜p = (I ∪ J, F˜p) at prices p as follows: There
is one node per bidder i, one node per item j, and an edge from i to j if and only if
item j gives bidder i the highest utility possible, i.e., ui,j(pj) ≥ ui,j′(pj′) for all j
′, and
pj ≥ ri,j. Note that F˜p ⊆ Fp. For i ∈ I we define F˜p(i) = {j : ∃ (i, j) ∈ F˜p} and similarly
F˜p(j) = {i : ∃ (i, j) ∈ F˜p}. Analogously, for T ⊆ I we define F˜p(T ) = ∪i∈T F˜p(i) and for
S ⊆ J we define F˜p(S) = ∪j∈SF˜p(i). Note that (1) ri,j ≤ pj < mi,j for all (i, j) ∈ F˜p and
(2) the matching µ with prices p is stable if and only if µ ⊆ F˜p. Also note that the edges in
Fp(i) \ F˜p(i) are all the edges (i, j) with maximum ui,j(pj) but pj < ri,j.
We define an alternating path is a sequence of edges in F˜p that alternates between
matched and unmatched edges. We require that all but the last item on the path are non-
dummy items. The last item can (but does not have to) be the dummy item. A tree in the
feasible first choice graph G˜p is an alternating tree rooted at bidder i if all paths from its
root to a leaf are alternating paths that either end with the dummy item, an unmatched
item, or a bidder whose feasible first choice items are all contained in the tree. We say that
an alternating tree with root i is maximal if it is the largest such tree. See Figure 2 for an
example.
5. Algorithm
Our algorithm starts with an empty matching and prices all zero. It then matches one
bidder after the other by augmenting the current matching along an alternating path. If
there is no such path, it repeatedly raises the price of all items in the maximal alternating
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Figure 2: The graph on the left is the (feasible) first choice graph. The bidders i1 to i6 are
on the left. The items j1 to j5 are on the right. The dummy item is j0. Edges in
µ ∩ F˜p are thick. Edges in F˜p are thin. Edges in Fp \ F˜p are dashed. The graph
on the right is a maximal alternating tree rooted at i1.
tree under consideration by the minimum amount (a) to make some item j 6∈ Fp(i) desirable
for some bidder i in the tree, or (b) to make some item j ∈ Fp(i) \ F˜p(i) feasible for some
bidder i in the tree, or (c) to make some item j ∈ F˜p(i) no longer desirable for some bidder i
in the tree. Thus it ensures that eventually an alternating path will exist and the matching
can be augmented. Note that a matched bidder i can become unmatched if the price of the
item j she is matched to reaches mi,j. Case (a) corresponds to δout, Case (b) corresponds
to δres, and Case (c) corresponds to δmax in the pseudocode below.
Modified Hungarian Method
1 set pj := 0 for all j ∈ J , ui := maxj′ vi,j′ for all i ∈ I, and µ := ∅,
2 while ∃ unmatched bidder i do
3 find a maximal alternating tree rooted at bidder i in G˜p
4 let T and S be the set of bidders and items in this tree
5 while all items j ∈ S are matched and j0 6∈ S do
6 compute δ := min(δout, δres, δmax) where
7 δout := mini∈T,j 6∈Fp(i)(ui + pj − vi,j)
4
8 δres := mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)\F˜p(i)(ri,j − pj)
4
9 δmax := mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)(mi,j − pj)
10 update prices, utilities, and matching by setting
11 pj := pj + δ for all j ∈ Fp(T ) \\ leads to a new graph G˜p
12 ui := maxj′(vi,j′ − pj′) for all i ∈ I
13 µ := µ ∩ F˜p \\ removes unfeasible edges from µ
14 find a maximal alternating tree rooted at bidder i in G˜p
15 let T and S be the set of bidders and items in this tree
16 end while
17 augment µ along alternating path rooted at i in G˜p
18 end while
19 output p, u, and µ
4We need to define mini∈T,j∈∅(...) =∞ as we might have Fp(I) = J or Fp(i) \ F˜p(i) = ∅.
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6. Feasibility and Stability
Theorem 6.1. The Modified HM finds a feasible and stable matching. It can be implemented
to run in O(nk3 log(k)).
Proof. The matching µ constructed by the Modified HM is a subset of the feasible first
choice graph G˜p at all times. Hence it suffices to show that after O(nk
3 log(k)) steps all
bidders are matched.
The algorithm consists of two nested loops. We analyze the running time in two steps:
(1) The time spent in the outer loop without the inner loop (ll. 2–4 and 17–18) and (2)
the time spent in the inner loop (ll. 5–16). Note that after each execution of the outer
while loop the number of matched bidder increases by one. A matched bidder i can only
become unmatched if the price of the item j she is matched to reaches mi,j. This can happen
only once for each pair (i, j), which implies that each bidder can become at most k times
unmatched. Thus, the outer loop is executed at most nk times. Since |S| ≤ k, it follows
that |T | ≤ k. Thus it is straightforward to implement the outer while loop in time O(k2).
We call an execution of the inner while loop special if (a) right before the start of
the execution the outer while loop was executed, (b) in the previous iteration of the inner
while loop the maximum price of a pair (i, j) was reached, or (c) the reserve price of a
pair (i, j) was reached. As each of these cases can happen at most nk times, there are
at most 3nk special executions of the inner while loop. Non-special executions increase
the number of items in the maximal alternating tree by at least one. Thus there are at
most k non-special executions between any two consecutive special executions. We present
next a data structure that (1) can be built in time O(k2) and (2) allows to implement all
non-special executions of the inner while loop between two consecutive special iterations in
time O(k2 log k). Thus the total time of the algorithm is O(nk3 log k).
Data structure:
(1) Keep a list of all bidders in T and a bit vector of length n where bit i is set to 1 if bidder
i belongs currently to T and to 0 otherwise. Keep a list of all items in S and bit vector
of length k, where bit j is set of 1 if item j belongs currently to S and to 0 otherwise.
Finally also keep a list and a bit vector of length k representing all items in Fp(T ).
(2) Keep a heap Hout and a value δout, such that Hout stores xi + pj − vi,j for all pairs
(i, j) with i ∈ T and j 6∈ Fp(i) and δout + xi equals ui for every i ∈ T. Keep a heap
Hres and a value δres, such that Hres stores ri,j − yj for all pairs (i, j) with i ∈ T and
j ∈ Fp(i) \ F˜p(i) and δres + yj equals pj for every j ∈ Fp(i) \ F˜p(i). Keep a heap Hmax
and a value δmax, such that Hmax stores mi,j − yj for all pairs (i, j) with i ∈ T and
j ∈ Fp(i) and δmax + yj equals pj for every j ∈ Fp(i).
(3) We also store at each bidder i its current ui, at each item j its current pj . Thus given a
pair (i, j) we can decide in constant time whether ui = vi,j − pj, i.e., whether j ∈ Fp(i).
Finally we keep a list of edges in µ.
At the beginning of each special execution of the inner while loop a list of bidders and
items currently in T and S are passed in either from the preceding execution of the outer
while loop (where T and S are constructed in time O(k2)) or from the previous execution
of the inner while loop. Recall that |S| ≤ k and thus |T | ≤ k. Thus we can build the above
data structures from scratch in time O(k2) as follows. To initialize the bit vector for T we
use the following approach: At the beginning of the algorithm the vector is once initialized
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to 0, taking time O(n). Then at the beginning of all but the first special execution of the
inner while loop the bit vector is “cleaned” by setting the bit of all elements of T in the
previous iteration to 0 using the list of elements of T of the previous iteration. Then the
list of elements currently in T is used to set the appropriate bits to 1. This takes time
O(k) per special execution. The bit vector of items in S has only k entries and thus is
simply initialized to 0 at the beginning of each special execution. Then the list of elements
currently in S is used to set the appropriate bits to 1. Given the list of bidders in T we
decide in constant time for each pair (i, j) with i ∈ T into which heap(s) its appropriate
values should be inserted. If j ∈ Fp(i) we also add j to Fp(T ) if it is not already in this set
update the bit vector and the list. When we have processed all pairs (i, j) with i ∈ T we
build the three heaps in time linear in their size such that all δ values are 0. Since |S| = k
we know that |T | = k. Thus, the initialization takes time O(k2).
To implement each iteration of the inner while loop we first perform a find-min operation
on all three heaps to determine δ. Then we remove all heap values that equal δ. Afterwards
we update the price of all items in Fp(T ) using the list of Fp(T ). We also update the utility
of all items in T as follows. If δ 6= δmax updating the utilities is just a simple subtraction
per bidder. If δ = δmax, i.e., pj becomes mi,j for some pair (i, j), then updating ui requires
computing vi,j − pj for all j and potentially removing the edge (i, j) from µ, which in turn
might cut a branch of the alternating tree. Thus, in this case we completely rebuild the
alternating tree, including S, T , and Fp(T ) from scratch. Note however that this can only
happen in a special execution of the inner while loop. If δ 6= δmax the elements removed
from the heaps tell us which new edges are added to F˜p(T ) and which new items to add
to Fp(T ). The new items in Fp(T ) gives a set of items from which we start to augment
the alternating tree in breadth first manner. For each new item j, we add to F˜p(T ) the
bidder it is matched to as new bidder to S and to F˜p(T ). For each new bidder i added to
F˜p(T ) we spend time O(k) to determine its adjacent edges in Fp(i) and insert the suitable
values for the pairs (i, j) into the three heaps. This process repeats until no new items and
no new bidders are added to Fp(i). During this traversal we also update the bit vectors
and lists representing T , S, and Fp(T ). Let Tnew be the set of bidders added to T during
an execution of the inner while loop and let r be the number of elements removed from
the heaps during the execution. Then the above data structures implement the inner while
loop in time O(r ∗ log k + |Tnew| ∗ k.) Now note that during a sequence of non-special
executions of the inner while loop between two consecutive special executions bidders are
never removed from T and each (i, j) pair with i ∈ T is added (and thus also removed)
at most once from each heap. Thus the total number of heap removals during all such
non-special executions is 3k2 and the total number of elements added to T is k, giving a
total running time of O(k2 log k) for all such non-special executions. Since there are at most
3nk special executions, the total time for all inner while loops is O(nk3 log k).
7. Bidder Optimality
Theorem 7.1. The Modified HM finds a bidder optimal matching in O(nk3 log(k)) steps.
We say that a (possibly empty) set S ⊆ J is strictly overdemanded for prices p wrt
T ⊆ I if (i) F˜p(T ) ⊆ S and (ii) ∀ R ⊆ S and R 6= ∅ : |F˜p(R) ∩ T | > |R|. Using Hall’s
Theorem [11] one can show that a feasible and stable matching exists for given prices p if
and only if there is no strictly overdemanded set of items S in F˜p.
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The proof strategy is as follows: In Lemma 7.2 we show that a feasible and stable
matching µ with prices p is bidder optimal if we have that pj ≤ p
′
j for all items j and all
feasible and stable matchings µ′ with prices p′. Afterwards, in Lemma 7.3, we establish a
lower bound on the price increase of strictly overdemanded items. Finally, in Lemma 7.4 we
argue that whenever the Modified HM updates the prices it updates the prices according
to Lemma 7.3. This completes the proof.
Lemma 7.2. If the matching µ with prices p is stable and pj ≤ p
′
j for all j and all stable
matchings µ′ with prices p′, then the matching µ with prices p is bidder optimal.
Proof. For a contradiction suppose that there exists a feasible and stable matching µ′ with
prices p′ such that u′i > ui for some bidder i. Let j be the item that bidder i is matched
to in µ and let j′ be the item that bidder i is matched to in µ′. Since pj′ ≤ p
′
j′ and
p′j′ < mi,j′ we have that ui,j′(pj′) = vi,j′ − pj′. Since the matching µ with prices p is
stable we have that ui = ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj ≥ ui,j′(pj′) = vi,j′ − pj′. It follows that
u′i = vi,j′ − p
′
j′ > ui = vi,j − pj ≥ vi,j′ − pj′ and, thus, p
′
j′ < pj′ . This gives a contradiction.
Lemma 7.3. Given p = (p1, . . . , pk) let ui = maxj ui,j(pj) for all i. Suppose that S ⊆ J is
strictly overdemanded for prices p with respect to T ⊆ I and let δ = min(δout, δres, δmax),
where δout = mini∈T,j 6∈Fp(i)(ui +pj − vi,j), δres = mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)\F˜p(i)(ri,j −pj), and δmax =
mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)(mi,j − pj). Then, for any stable matching µ
′ with prices p′ with p′j ≥ pj for
all j, we have that p′j ≥ pj + δ for all j ∈ Fp(T ).
Proof. We prove the claim in two steps. In the first step, we show that p′j ≥ pj + δ for all
j ∈ F˜p(T ). In the second step, we show that p
′
j ≥ pj + δ for all j ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T ).
Step 1. Consider the set of items A = {j ∈ F˜p(T ) | ∀k ∈ F˜p(T ) : p
′
j − pj ≤ p
′
k − pk} and
the set of bidders B = F˜p(A)∩T. Assume by contradiction that δ
′ = minj∈F˜p(T )(p
′
j−pj) < δ.
We show that this implies that |B| > |A| ≥ |F˜p′(B)|, which gives a contradiction.
The set of items S is strictly overdemanded for prices p wrt to T and A. Thus, since
A ⊆ S and A 6= ∅, |B| = |F˜p(A) ∩ T | > |A|. Next we show that A ⊇ F˜p′(B) and, thus,
|A| ≥ |F˜p′(B)|. It suffices to show that F˜p′(i)\A = ∅ for all bidders i ∈ B. For a contradiction
suppose that there exists a bidder i ∈ B and an item k ∈ F˜p′(i) \ A. Recall that we must
have (1) ui,k(p
′
k) ≥ 0, (2) ui,k(p
′
k) ≥ ui,k′(p
′
k′) for all k
′, and (3) pk ≥ ri,k. Recall also that
(1)–(3) imply that ri,k ≤ p
′
k < mi,k and so ui,k(p
′
k) = vi,k − p
′
k.
We know that there exists j ∈ A such that j ∈ F˜p(i). Since j ∈ A we have that p
′
j <
pj + δ ≤ mi,j and so ui,j(p
′
j) = vi,j −p
′
j . Thus, since k ∈ F˜p′(i), vi,k−p
′
k ≥ vi,j −p
′
j . Finally,
since j ∈ F˜p(i) and pk ≤ p
′
k < mi,k, we have that ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj ≥ ui,k(pk) = vi,k − pk.
Case 1: k ∈ J \ Fp(B). Since δ ≤ δout ≤ ui + pk − vi,k and ui = vi,j − pj we have that
δ ≤ vi,j − pj + pk − vi,k. Rearranging this gives vi,k − pk + δ ≤ vi,j − pj. Since p
′
k ≥ pk and
pj > p
′
j − δ this implies that vi,k − p
′
k < vi,j − p
′
j. Contradiction!
Case 2: k ∈ Fp(B) \ F˜p(B). If p
′
k − pk ≤ p
′
j − pj = δ
′ then p′k ≤ pk + δ
′ < pk + δ. Since
δ ≤ δres ≤ ri,k−pk this implies that p
′
k < ri,k. Contradiction! Otherwise, p
′
k−pk > p
′
j −pj.
Since vi,j − pj ≥ vi,k − pk this implies that vi,j − p
′
j > vi,k − p
′
k. Contradiction!
Case 3: k ∈ F˜p(B) \ A. Since j ∈ A and k 6∈ A we have that p′k − pk > δ
′ = p′j − pj .
Since vi,j − pj ≥ vi,k − pk this implies that vi,j − p
′
j > vi,k − p
′
k. Contradiction!
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Step 2. Consider an arbitrary item j ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T ) such that p
′
j − pj ≤ p
′
j′ − pj′ for
all j′ ∈ Fp(T )\ F˜p(T ) and a bidder i ∈ T such that j ∈ Fp(i). Assume by contradiction that
δ′ = p′j − pj < δ. We show that this implies that F˜p′(i) = ∅, which gives a contradiction.
First observe that δ′ < δ ≤ δres ≤ ri,j − pj and, thus, p
′
j < pj + δ ≤ ri,j, which shows
that j 6∈ F˜p′(i). Next consider an arbitrary item k 6= j. For a contradiction suppose that
k ∈ F˜p′(i). It follows that ri,k ≤ p
′
k < mi,k and ui,k(p
′
k) = vi,k − p
′
k ≥ ui,j(p
′
j).
Since p′j = pj + δ
′ < pj + δ ≤ mi,j we have that ui,j(p
′
j) = vi,j − p
′
j and so vi,k − p
′
k ≥
vi,j − p
′
j. Finally, since j ∈ Fp(i) and pk ≤ p
′
k < mi,k, we have that ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj ≥
ui,k(pk) = vi,k − pk.
Case 1: k ∈ J \ Fp(T ). Since δ ≤ δout ≤ ui + pk − vi,k and ui = vi,j − pj we have that
δ ≤ vi,j − pj + pk − vi,k. Rearranging this gives vi,k − pk + δ ≤ vi,j − pj. Since p
′
k ≥ pk and
pj > p
′
j − δ this implies that vi,k − p
′
k < vi,j − p
′
j. Contradiction!
Case 2: k ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T ). If p
′
k − pk ≤ p
′
j − pj = δ
′ then p′k ≤ pk + δ
′ < pk + δ. Since
δ ≤ δres ≤ ri,k−pk this implies that p
′
k < ri,k. Contradiction! Otherwise, p
′
k−pk > p
′
j −pj.
Since vi,j − pj ≥ vi,k − pk this implies that vi,j − p
′
j > vi,k − p
′
k. Contradiction!
Case 3: k ∈ F˜p(T ). From Step 1 we know that p
′
k − pk ≥ δ > δ
′ = p′j − pj. Since
vi,j − pj ≥ vi,k − pk this implies that vi,j − p
′
j > vi,k − p
′
k. Contradiction!
Lemma 7.4. Let p be the prices computed by the Modified HM. Then for any stable matching
µ′ with prices p′ we have that pj ≤ p
′
j for all j.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction over the price updates. Let pt denote the prices
after the t-th price update.
For t = 0 the claim follows from the fact that pt = 0 and p′j ≥ 0 for all items j and all
feasible matchings µ′ with prices p′.
For t > 0 assume that the claim is true for t− 1. Let S be the set of items and let T be
the set of bidders considered by the matching mechanism for the t-th price update. We claim
that S is strictly overdemanded for prices pt−1 wrt to T. This is true because: (1) S and T
are defined as the set of items resp. bidders in a maximal alternating tree and, thus, there
are no edges in F˜pt−1 from bidders in T to items in J \ S which shows that F˜pt−1(T ) ⊆ S.
(2) For all subsets R ⊂ S and R 6= ∅ the number of “neighbors” in the alternating tree
under consideration is strictly larger than |R| which shows that |F˜pt−1(R) ∩ T | > |R|. By
the induction hypothesis p′j ≥ p
t−1
j for all items j ∈ J and, thus, Lemma 7.3 shows that
p′j ≥ p
t−1
j + δ for all items j ∈ Fpt−1(t). The Modified HM sets p
t
j = p
t−1
j + δ for all items
j ∈ Fpt−1(T ) and p
t
j = p
t−1
j for all items j 6∈ Fpt−1(T ) and so p
′
j ≥ p
t
j for all items j ∈ J .
8. Truthfulness
The following example shows that with our notion of stability bidder optimality no
longer implies truthfulness, even if (i) there are no reserve prices, i.e., ri,j = 0 for all i and
j, (ii) maximum prices depend only on the item, i.e., for all i there exists a constant mi
such that mi,j = mi for all j, and (iii) no two bidders have the same maximum price, i.e.,
mi 6= mk for any two bidders i 6= k.More specifically, it shows that a bidder can improve her
utility by lying about the valuation of a single item. Since the bidder optimal utilities are
uniquely defined, this shows that no mechanism that computes a bidder optimal matching
µ with prices p can be truthful. Note that if (i) to (iii) hold and there exists constants
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α1 ≥ · · · ≥ αk and v1, . . . , vk such that vi,j = vi · αj for all i and j, then Ashlagi et al. [3]
show the existence of a truthful mechanism.
           
matched
unmatched
2
5, 4
4, 3
2
2
2
4
3
0
1
0
6, 6
5, 4
4, 3
6
4
9
6, 6
10, 3
11, 4
4, 4
5, 6 5, 6
0, 4
4, 4
10, 3
Figure 3: Bidders are on the left and items are on the right. The numbers next to the
bidders indicate their utilities. The numbers next to the items indicate their
prices. The labels along the edges show valuations and maximum prices. The
graph on the left depicts the bidder optimal matching for the “true” valuations.
The graph on the right depicts the bidder optimal matching for the “falsified”
valuations. Specifically, in the matching on the right bidder 2 misreports her
valuation for item 1. This gives her a strictly higher utility, and shows that lying
“pays off”.
9. Generalized Linear Utilities
The following theorem generalizes our results to utilities of the form ui,j(pj) = vi,j −
ci · cj · pj for pj < mi,j and ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise. This reduction does not work if
ui,j(pj) = vi,j − ci,j · pj for pj < mi,j and ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise. We prove the existence
of a bidder optimal solution for more general utilities in [6].
Theorem 9.1. The matching µˆ with prices pˆ is bidder optimal for vˆ = (vˆi,j), rˆ = (rˆi,j),
mˆ = (mˆi,j) and utilities ui,j(pj) = vi,j − ci · cj · pj if pj < mi,j and ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise
if and only if the matching µ with prices p, where µ = µˆ and p = (cj · pˆj), is bidder optimal
for v = (vˆi,j/ci), r = (cj · rˆi,j), m = (cj · mˆi,j) and utilities ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj if pj < mi,j
and ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise.
Proof. Since pˆj < mˆi,j if and only if p < mi,j we have that uˆi,j(pˆj) = ci · ui,j(pj). Since
µˆ = µ this implies that uˆi = ci · ui for all i.
Feasibility. Since ci > 0 for all i we have that uˆi ≥ 0 for all i if and only if ui = uˆi/ci ≥ 0
for all i. Since cj > 0 for all i we have that pˆj ≥ 0 for all j if and only if pj = cj · pˆj ≥ 0 for
all j. Since µ = µˆ and ri,j = cj · rˆi,j, pj = cj · pˆj, and mi,j = cj · mˆi,j for all i and j we have
that rˆi,j ≤ pˆj < mˆi,j for all (i, j) ∈ µˆ if and only if ri,j ≤ pj < mi,j for all (i, j) ∈ µ.
Stability. If µˆ with pˆ is stable then µ with p is stable because ui = ci · uˆi ≥ ci ·
uˆi,j(pˆj) = ui,j(pj) for all i and j. If µ with p is stable then µˆ with pˆ is stable because
uˆi = ui/ci ≥ ui,j(pj)/ci = uˆi,j(pˆj) for all i and j.
Bidder Optimality. For a contraction suppose that µˆ with pˆ is bidder optimal but µ
with p is not. Then there must be a feasible and stable matching µ′ with p′ such that
u′i > ui for at least one bidder i. By transforming µ
′ with p′ into µˆ′ with pˆ′ we get a feasible
and stable matching for which uˆ′i = ci · u
′
i > ci · ui = uˆi. Contradiction!
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For a contraction suppose that µ with p is bidder optimal but µˆ with pˆ is not. Then
there must be a feasible and stable matching µˆ′ with pˆ′ such that uˆ′i > uˆi for at least one
bidder i. By transforming µˆ′ with pˆ′ into µ′ with p′ we get a feasible and stable matching
for which u′i = uˆ
′
i/ci > uˆi/ci = ui. Contradiction!
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